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1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that traditional merger analysis cannot be directly applied to multi-
sided platform industries.1 There are at least two reasons for that. First, a horizontal merger
between multi-sided platforms not only a¤ects the level of prices but also their structure. In
particular, such a merger may lead to a lower price on one or more sides of the market even in
the absence of cost-related e¢ ciency gains.2 Second, a merger between two or more platforms
may generate network-related e¢ ciencies that are absent in traditional markets. For instance, if
the merger leads to the creation of a single platform or if the merging platforms are maintained
but made interoperable, agents on each side of the market may end up interacting with more
agents on the other side, which would a¤ect positively their surplus if the relevant network
e¤ects are positive.
Several merger cases have involved multi-sided platforms.3 Interestingly, the way compe-
tition authorities have addressed the competitive e¤ects of mergers in these markets has been
varying over time and across jurisdictions. While the multi-sided nature of the relevant market
was overlooked in some cases, it was crucial to the decision in other cases.
For instance, in 2004, when analyzing the merger between the two weekly local newspapers
Archant and Independent News and Media,4 the UK Competition Commission focused on the
impact of the merger on advertisers and ignored its e¤ect on readers. In other media merger
cases involving TV channels, such as BSkybs acquisition of 24% of KirchpayTV5 in 2000 and
News Corporations acquisition of 25% of Premiere6 in 2008, the e¤ect on the advertising side
and the existence of network externalities seem to have been neglected to a large extent.7
In other cases, however, competition authorities have analyzed the e¤ect on all the sides
of the market when assessing mergers between platforms. An example is the decision by the
US Department of Justice and the Federal Communications Commission to clear, in 2008, the
merger between Sirius and XM, the only two US satellite digital radio services. As discussed
by Belleamme and Peitz (2015), the merger would probably have been blocked if the two-
sided nature of the market had not been recognized since it would have been a 2-to-1merger.
However, by taking into account the advertisersside, authorities widened the product market
(by including other kinds of broadcast) and cleared the merger. The two-sidedness of the
market was also critical in the decision of the European Commission to clear, in 2007, the
1See, for example, Wright (2004), Evans and Noel (2008), Evans and Schmalensee (2013) and Weyl and
White (2014).
2See e.g. Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) and Leonello (2010).
3For a recent discussion of merger cases in multi-sided markets, see, for instance, Filistrucchi (2017).
4UK Competition Commission, A report on the acquisition by Archant Limited of the London Newspapers
of Independent News and Media Limited,2004.
5Case No COMP/JV.37-BSKYB/KirchPayTV.
6Case No COMP/M.5121-News Corp/Premiere.
7See Filistrucchi et al. (2014) and Foros et al. (2015) for a discussion of these and other merger cases in which
the multi-sidedness of the market was overlooked by competition authorities.
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merger between Travelport and Worldspan.8 The Commission claimed that this merger would
not be detrimental to agents on one side of the market (travel agents) due to the need of the
platforms to build a su¢ ciently large network to attract agents on the other side (travel service
providers).9
Note that in the latter two cases competition authorities did not (at least explicitly) ac-
count for the potential e¢ ciencies stemming from an increase in indirect network e¤ects after
the merger. These e¢ ciencies played, however, a key role in the Netherlands Competition
Authoritys assessment of the merger between the (only) two Dutch yellow pages directories,
European Directories and Truvo.10 In particular, the merger was approved on the basis that
advertisers and users would benet from using a larger platform. This makes this case a mile-
stonein the assessment of mergers between multi-sided platforms (Camesasca et al., 2009).
Despite the existence of many merger cases involving competing multi-sided platforms, the
literature on such mergers remains scarce and competition authorities still lack clear guidance
as to how they should be assessed. In this paper we discuss this literature and argue that the
Cournot model can help address some of the challenges it faces.
To illustrate the insights that can be drawn from the Cournot model regarding mergers
between multi-sided platforms, we develop a simple model in whichK ( 2) two-sided platforms
o¤er a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot. We derive the e¤ects of average-
marginal-cost-preserving (AMCP) mergers, i.e., mergers that do not a¤ect the industry-wide
average marginal cost on any side of the market.11 Considering rst general demand functions,
we show that the comparison between the pre-merger externality-adjusted priceon each side
of the market and the average marginal cost on that side plays a key role in determining the
e¤ect of a merger on consumers.12 When both externality-adjusted prices are above (below) the
corresponding average marginal costs, a merger harms (benets) consumers on both sides. We
then restrict attention to linear demand functions and establish that a merger harms consumers
on both sides if (total) network e¤ects are small, benets consumers on one side and harms
consumers on the other side if network e¤ects are intermediate, and benets consumers on both
sides if network e¤ects are large.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summarize the main
results of the existing literature on horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms. In Section
3 we discuss the Cournot model in multi-sided markets and explain why it can provide novel
insights into the impact of mergers between multi-sided platforms. In Section 4 we lay out our
model and derive predictions regarding the e¤ect of a merger between two-sided platforms on
8Case No COMP/M.4523-Travelport/Worldspan.
9See paragraph 76 of the decision and Belleamme and Peitz (2015, p. 644).
10Case 6246 European Directories-Truvo Nederland.
11Note that AMCP mergers include as a special case any merger in a symmetric industry in the absence of
cost-related e¢ ciency gains.
12The externality-adjusted price is dened as the price net of the value of the network externality received by
the consumer.
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consumers (on both sides of the market). In Section 5 we conclude with a discussion of avenues
for future research.
2 A progress report on the existing literature
In a quite specic but provocative paper, Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) show that, in
a two-sided market, even mergers to a monopoly may not lead to higher prices on either side
of the market. Their model features two newspapers and two advertisers of di¤erentiated
products, and assumes that consumer preferences for newspapers and products are correlated.
Marginal readers are less valuable to advertisers than captive consumers and some of them may
be unprotable to the newspaper because the advertising revenue they generate is insu¢ cient
to cover the subsidy they receive when buying the newspaper. However, a newspaper cannot
exclude these readers because it is unable to engage in price discrimination. In a duopoly
equilibrium, a small decrease in the price of a newspaper would attract the least valuable con-
sumers away from the rival newspaper and, therefore, may increase the rivals prot. A merger
makes platforms internalize this externality, which explains why it may lead to a decrease in
newspaper prices.
In a similar vein, Leonello (2010) analyzes a merger to monopoly between two platforms
located at the extreme points of a Hotelling line on both sides of the market. She nds that
merging rms may have incentives to lower their prices on at least one side of the market if
indirect network externalities are strong enough. Baranes et al. (2016) extend her analysis by
considering four platforms equidistantly located on a Salop circle. Assuming linear externalities,
they show that mergers between adjacent platforms may lead to lower prices if externalities are
strong enough. By contrast, using a model with possibly non-linear externalities, and where
platform di¤erentiation is driven by a random utility that makes all platforms equidistant to
each other, Tan and Zhou (2017) conclude that a merged entity always has incentives to raise
prices (in the absence of cost-related e¢ ciency gains). Both Baranes et al. (2016) and Tan
and Zhou (2017) assume full market coverage, which is questionable for merger analysis since
aggregate quantities are then xed.
The importance of free media has motivated a line of research on multi-sided platforms
that are solely nanced by advertising.13 Particular attention has been given to the impact
of a merger on ad volumes and per viewer ad prices. The earlier literature concludes that, by
reducing competition for viewers, a merger increases ad volumes and decreases per viewer ad
prices (Anderson and Coate, 2005). Subsequent work by Anderson et al. (2012) and Anderson et
al. (2018) shows that advertising congestion or multi-homing by viewers can reverse this nding.
If viewers multi-home, platforms lose their monopoly position in delivering their audience to
advertisers. As a result, a merger leads on the advertising side to the usual market power
13See e.g. Foros et al. (2015).
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e¤ect by which a monopolist reduces volume to increase price. In the presence of advertising
congestion across platforms (for example, if viewers mix between platforms and have limited
attention to ads), ad volume in a platform exerts a negative externality on other platforms that
is internalized if a merger occurs. In this case, a merger may benet consumers by reducing
ad volume. Liu et al. (2004) reach a similar conclusion regarding the impact of a merger on
product characteristics. They show that an industry with a larger number of competitors may
provide content of lower quality, which may be detrimental to viewers.14 Finally, Anderson and
Peitz (2015) rely on an aggregative game approach to extend the analysis of competition in a
media industry to an arbitrary number of platforms, and nd that in the case of free media, a
merger harms consumers but may or may not harm advertisers.
As mentioned earlier, the tools of traditional merger analysis need to be adapted before
being used in multi-sided markets. A¤eldt et al. (2013) take a rst step in this direction by
proposing a way of adapting the Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) measure (Farrell and Shapiro,
2010) to two-sided markets and apply it to a hypothetical merger in the Dutch newspaper
market. Cosnita-Langlais et al. (2018) suggest an extended measure of UPP in two-sided
markets that incorporates feedback e¤ects15 and show that it can lead to a merger assessment
that is qualitatively di¤erent from the one obtained under A¤eldt et al. (2013)s measure.
Empirical evidence on the e¤ects of media mergers suggests that ad prices increase while
ad volumes may increase or decrease following a merger.16 Jeziorski (2014) estimates a struc-
tural supply-and-demand model using data from the 1996-2006 merger wave in the US free
radio industry, and concludes that the merger wave caused a 11% drop in ad volumes and a
6% increase in ad prices (per viewer).17 Fan (2010) uses a structural model of the US daily
newspaper market and simulates a merger in the Minneapolis market. She concludes that
newspaper prices increase and circulation decreases, resulting in welfare losses for readers and
advertisers. In addition, she nds signicant welfare losses from adjustments in product char-
acteristics (lower quality, lower local news ratio and lower variety). However, the empirical
evidence on these adjustments is mixed. Sweeting (2010), for instance, concludes that radio
stations become more di¤erentiated after a merger. This conicting result may reect a tension
between reducing the cost of content and reducing audience cannibalization.
14Their analysis is based on the Hotelling model with endogenous horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation.
15More precisely, their measure takes into account how a price change on one side of the market may feed
back on the optimal price on the other side of the market.
16There are several still unpublished papers on this topic. For instance, Brown and Williams (2002) study
local free radio markets in the US and nd that local concentration increases ad prices. By contrast, Chipty
(2007) nds no e¤ect of concentration on ad prices.
17This merger wave was triggered by the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
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3 Cournot competition and mergers in multi-sided markets
The Cournot model has been a workhorse for traditional merger analysis (see e.g. Farrell
and Shapiro, 1990; Nocke and Whinston, 2010, 2013). This model is primarily interpreted as
imposing a specic form of rms conduct. More precisely, its key assumption is that each rm
anticipates that its rivals will maintain their quantities at a given level when setting its own
strategy. An alternative interpretation is that the Cournot model is a reduced-form model for
a capacity-then-price game (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983).
Before discussing Cournot competition among multi-sided platforms, note that an impor-
tant di¤erence between an oligopoly model in a one-sided market and its counterpart in a
multi-sided model is that the latter must not only set assumptions on rmsconduct but also
on how demand on one side of the market is a¤ected by what happens on the other side(s)
of the market. In particular, the model needs to specify how the feedback e¤ects related to
indirect network e¤ects are factored into competition.
In a number of multi-sided markets, a platforms capacity is a key strategic variable. This is
the case for instance for nightclubs, shopping centers, and exhibition halls. In such industries,
Cournot competition is a natural way of modeling platformsbehavior. Moreover, studying
Cournot competition among platforms can be useful even when capacity constraints are less
relevant. As mentioned earlier, one may interpret the assumption of Cournot competition on
one side of the market as an assumption about platformsconduct on that side: each platform
anticipates that its competitors will respond to a change in its strategy by adjusting their
strategies in a way that leaves their demands unchanged.
A more subtle issue is the treatment of feedback e¤ects in multi-sided markets. Under the
standard Bertrand oligopoly model - used in a large part of the literature on platforms - rms
set publicly observable prices, and the demand on each side is assumed to adjust to any change
on the other side(s) (induced by a change in prices). This implicitly amounts to assuming that
quantities adjust faster than prices and, therefore, that some form of price rigidity exists.18
This raises the question of whether alternative models may better t situations where prices
adjust faster. The existing literature features three approaches that can address this issue, one
of them being the extension of the Cournot equilibrium concept to platforms. We now discuss
the two other approaches and how they relate to the Cournot equilibrium.
White and Weyl (2016) argue that in practice platforms nd ways around the userscoor-
dination problem and propose a solution concept capturing this idea. More specically, they
assume that platforms set insulating tari¤s, i.e., prices that are contingent on the market out-
come on the other side in a way that makes sales on one side unrelated to the demand on the
other side. In the case of homogeneous network e¤ects - which we focus on in our model - this
amounts to insuring users perfectly against any kind of coordination risk.
18Alternatively, one could assume that users are able to coordinate on a Nash equilibrium instantaneously,
which is arguably a very strong form of rationality.
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The concepts of insulated equilibrium and Cournot equilibrium are related as they both
address the userscoordination problem. However, they di¤er in two dimensions. First, when
network e¤ects are heterogeneous, the insulating tari¤ insures only a representativeconsumer
against the coordination risk related to the other sides participation, while the Cournot model
entails such insurance for all users. Moreover, even when network e¤ects are homogeneous,
the two concepts di¤er in terms of assumed platforms conduct. The insulated equilibrium
uses sophisticated non-linear tari¤s to resolve the userscoordination problem under a price-
setting conduct assumption. By contrast, in the Cournot model both usersexpectations and
equilibrium prices are derived from the quantity-setting conduct assumption.19
A common advantage of both models is that they allow for the analysis of highly competitive
platform markets.20 Which model is best suited for applied analysis depends, at least partly,
on which of the following two assumptions is considered as being the least restrictive: the
sophistication of contracts that the insulated equilibrium relies on, or the quantity-setting
assumption in the Cournot model.
A related solution concept was used by Katz and Shapiro (1985) in their seminal article on
competition with (direct) network e¤ects: in their baseline model users form expectations about
network sizes and then rms take these expectations as given when they compete. The model is
then solved under two assumptions: the rst is a rational expectations assumption, i.e. users
expectations are fullled in equilibrium, and the second is an assumption of passive beliefs, i.e.
usersexpectations are not a¤ected by o¤-equilibrium-path prices. This approach uncouples
the formation of demand with network externalities from platformsconduct and is therefore
compatible with di¤erent conduct models. For instance, Katz and Shapiro (1985) and de Palma
et al. (1999) assume that rms set quantities, while Hurkens and López (2014) consider price
competition. While interesting, this approach su¤ers from a signicant limitation when applied
to multi-sided markets. As platforms take users expectations about participation as given,
they do not account for the value that a user creates for the other side(s) of the market when
setting prices or quantities. Thus, this approach ignores a key driver of the di¤erences between
one-sided and multi-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006). Relatedly, note that the
Cournot model may be viewed as a compromise between this approach and the standard price
competition model for multi-sided markets. The reason is that it allows users expectations
about participation on other platforms to be simple (and in particular not a¤ected by o¤-
equilibrium-path prices) while assuming that those expectations are a¤ected by the platforms,
which makes the latter internalize the externalities between users on the two sides of the market.
To our knowledge, Katz and Shapiro (1985) are the rst to consider the standard Cournot
equilibrium concept in a model with network e¤ects. In the appendix of their paper, they
19 In particular, we may expect the Cournot equilibrium to be less competitive than the insulated equilibrium.
20 It is well known that equilibrium analysis in standard price competition models raises issues of multiplicity
or non-existence when platforms are strongly substitutable from usersperspective (see e.g., Caillaud and Jullien,
2003 and Armstrong, 2006).
7
study an extension in which rms commit publicly to the quantities they set. The Cournot
equilibrium concept has also been used in the literature on multi-sided markets but only in a
limited number of papers. An early model of two-sided Cournot markets is provided by Schi¤
(2003) who considers a setting in which platforms set quantities on both sides of the market
and the valuation of indirect network externalities is homogeneous within each side. He nds
that a monopoly is socially preferable to a duopoly with incompatible platforms because of
larger network e¤ects under the former. Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2014) propose a similar
model,21 but with platforms that are located at the extremes of a Hotelling line, and show that
heterogeneity in the valuation of externalities may lead to asymmetric market shares (despite
platforms being symmetric ex ante).22
Finally, a number of papers in the media literature assume that media platforms set quanti-
ties on the advertiser side while setting (possibly zero) prices on the other side of the market.23
For instance, Kind et al. (2007) build a model in which TV stations o¤er advertising space to
advertisers and (free) content to viewers. They show that there is too little advertising when
the channelsprograms are close substitutes and that the more viewers dislike ads, the more
likely it is that social welfare is increasing in the number of channels. Peitz and Valletti (2008)
and Crampes et al. (2009) consider similar models but investigate also the case in which plat-
forms charge viewers. This allows them to compare the free-to-air and pay-tv business models.
A common feature of these papers is that consumers are assumed to single-home. Anderson
et al. (2016) relax this assumption and show that a number of puzzles identied in the previ-
ous literature on media economics can be resolved by allowing for multi-homing consumers. A
key di¤erence between the approach adopted in those papers and the one we illustrate in the
subsequent model is that the agents on the Cournot side of media platforms (i.e. advertisers)
typically multi-home, while we consider a setting where agents single-home on both sides of
the market. This implies that the nature of competition that we examine is di¤erent from the
one considered in the media literature.
We argue that the Cournot model can provide useful insights regarding the e¤ects of a
merger between platforms on users (on both sides of the market) because of two appealing
properties. First, unlike price competition models, the Cournot model generates predictions
regarding externality-adjusted prices, which makes it possible to determine directly the welfare
e¤ects of a merger and, therefore, to sign those e¤ects under a potentially larger set of circum-
stances than price competition. Second, the platform Cournot model is more tractable than
price competition models when it comes to incorporate cost asymmetries in the model or when
one wants to consider an industry with more than two platforms. The next section illustrates
those advantages through a simple model in the spirit of Katz and Shapiro (1985).
21They consider both quantity competition and price competition.
22The logic is similar to the one behind the emergence of quality di¤erentiation as a way of relaxing competition.
23See the surveys by Anderson and Jullien (2015) and Peitz and Reisinger (2015).
8
4 A simple model
4.1 Setup
Consider a two-sided market with a nite number of platforms indexed by k 2 f1; :::;Kg. The
marginal cost of platform k on side i 2 f1; 2g is constant and denoted by cki 2 R+. On each
side of the market, there is a unit mass of consumers. Platforms charge membership fees -
which we will refer to as priceshenceforth - on both sides of the markets. We assume further
that platforms are homogeneous, which implies that consumers care only about the mass of
consumers on the other side of the platform they join and the price they pay.24 Consumers
single-home and the utility of a consumer on side i of platform k paying a price pki and having
access to a mass nkj of consumers on the other side is:
uki = ~vi + in
k
j   pki ;
where i 2 R is known, with 1 + 2 > 0, and ~vi is a random individual stand-alone payo¤
distributed according to a strictly increasing and twice di¤erentiable cdf Fi : R! [0; 1].
Platforms simultaneously set the mass of consumers nk1 and n
k
2 they serve on each side of the
market. Then, given the vector of quantities n   nki k=1;:::;Ki=1;2 , prices adjust to equate demand
and supply on each platform. More precisely, a vector of prices p   pki k=1;:::;Ki=1;2 is determined
such that the allocation of consumers across platforms, n, is consistent with individual utility
maximization by consumers.
We refer to zki  pki   inkj as the externality-adjusted price on side i of platform k.25
Since platforms are homogeneous, consumers on side i only join the platforms with the lowest
externality-adjusted price on side i, denoted by zi  minkfzki g. Therefore, all rms with
positive participation have the same externality-adjusted price, zi (as in Katz and Shapiro,
1985), and the total mass of consumers on side i who join a platform, Ni 
PK
k=1 n
k
i , is equal
to 1  Fi(zi).
Let Zi : [0; 1] ! R [ f 1;+1g be the inverse demand function of side i consumers, i.e.,
let Zi(Ni) be the externality-adjusted price on side i for which Ni is the mass of consumers
who join a platform. Since Zi() is the inverse of 1   Fi(), it is strictly decreasing and twice
di¤erentiable.
Given the quantities chosen by platforms, n, prices are uniquely dened for platforms with
positive participation and are given by:
pki = Zi(Ni) + in
k
j :
24This homogeneity assumption is similar to the one made by Katz and Shapiro (1985) in their model of direct
network e¤ects. A limitation of this approach is that it does not allow for products to be di¤erentiated other
than on the magnitude of network e¤ects (that could be seen as a qualityattribute).
25This is the counterpart in our multi-sided market setting of what Katz and Shapiro (1985) call the hedonic
price.
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The resulting prot of platform k is:
k = Z1 (N1)n
k
1 + Z2 (N2)n
k
2 + (1 + 2)n
k
1n
k
2  

ck1n
k
1 + c
k
2n
k
2

:
4.2 Equilibrium analysis
We focus on equilibria in which all platforms have positive participation on both sides. Each
platform k maximizes its prot with respect to
 
nk1; n
k
2

. The corresponding rst-order condi-
tions are: 8<:Z1 (N1) + Z 01 (N1)nk1 = ck1   (1 + 2)nk2Z2 (N2) + Z 02 (N2)nk2 = ck2   (1 + 2)nk1;
These conditions can be interpreted as follows. The marginal revenue on side 1 is given by
Z1 (N1) + Z
0
1 (N1)n
k
1 + 1n
k
2 = p
k
1 +
@pk1
@nk1
nk1: In equilibrium, this is equated to the marginal
opportunity cost on side 1, i.e. ck1   2nk2; which accounts for the fact that increasing
nk1 raises the cross-side externality and thus the price on the other side by a factor 2: A
similar reasoning applies to side 2.
We make the following assumption which ensures that the second-order conditions for
optimality are satised (see Appendix).
Assumption 1. For every (N1; N2) 2 [0; 1]2:8<:2Z 01 (N1) + Z 001 (N1)N1 < 0 and 2Z 02 (N2) + Z 002 (N2)N2 < 0[2Z 01 (N1) + max fZ 001 (N1)N1; 0g] [2Z 02 (N2) + max fZ 002 (N2)N2; 0g] > (1 + 2)2
The rst condition is standard and states that the one-sided monopoly prot is concave
in quantity (see e.g. Novshek, 1985). The second condition imposes an upper bound on the
magnitude of total network e¤ects and is reminiscent of similar conditions in the literature on
multi-sided markets (see e.g. Armstrong, 2006).
The aggregative nature of the Cournot game allows us to determine easily the aggregate
demand. Summing the systems of rst-order-conditions across platforms yields:8>>>><>>>>:
KZ1 (N1) + Z
0
1 (N1)N1  
KX
k=1
ck1 + (1 + 2)N2 = 0
KZ2 (N2) + Z
0
2 (N2)N2  
KX
k=1
ck2 + (1 + 2)N1 = 0
(1)
We show in the Appendix that under Assumption 1, there exists a unique pair (N1; N2)
that satises these conditions.26
26This also implies uniqueness of the individual platforms quantities provided that Z01 (N1)Z
0
2 (N2) is not
equal to (1 + 2)
2 at the equilibrium.
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Let ci 
P
k c
k
i =K denote the average marginal cost on side i across platforms, ni 
Ni=K the average mass of side i consumers across platforms, and "i(zi)    ziZ 1i (zi)
dZ 1i (zi)
dzi
the
(absolute value of the) elasticity of demand on side i with respect to the externality-adjusted
price zi. In a Cournot equilibrium in which all platforms have positive participation on both
sides, all externality-adjusted prices on a given side are the same:
pki   inkj = zi:
Rearranging condition (1) shows that the externality-adjusted price on a given side is deter-
mined by a condition similar to the Lerner formula under Cournot competition, adjusted for
the externalities:27
zi   ci + (1 + 2) nj
zi
=
1
K"i (zi)
:
Observe that the distribution of marginal costs across platforms is irrelevant: only the average
marginal cost on each side matters (as long as all platforms are active). Notice also that
only total network e¤ects 1+2 matter for the externality-adjusted prices and, therefore, for
equilibrium aggregate quantities on each side.28
One advantage of the Cournot model in one-sided markets is that it relates the aggregate
Lerner index to the Herndahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI)29 and the price-elasticity of demand.
A natural question that arises is how the standard Lerner index should be modied to account
for network e¤ects and whether (and how) the HHI on each side should be adjusted to be a good
measure of this index. One possible approach is to modify the Lerner index for a given side of
the market by incorporating the network externalities received by that side. This amounts to
replacing prices in the standard denition of the Lerner index by externality-adjusted prices.30
We show in the Appendix that the HHI needs to be adjusted downward with respect to its
standard denition, and that this adjustment should be greater the larger the network e¤ects
and the larger the correlationbetween rmsmarket shares on the two sides of the market.
27The externality-adjusted price is the natural counterpart for the Cournot model of the externality-adjusted
cost for the Bertrand model with di¤erentiated platforms. In the Cournot model, each rm perceives a residual
demand curve Di
 
pki   inkj
  Pl6=k nli; where Di (p) = 1   Fi (p). Following Rochet and Tirole (2006), the
optimal price for platform k solves
pki  
 
cki   jnkj

pki
=
1
i
where i is the elasticity of the residual demand curve, which is given by i =
pkiD
0
i(p
k
i inkj )
Di(pki inkj ) 
P
l 6=k nli
=
pki
Z0i(Ni)n
k
i
in the Cournot model. Thus, the di¤erence with price competition is only about the nature of the residual
demand curve. While the notion of externality-adjusted cost highlights the opportunity cost of selling on each
side, the notion of externality-adjusted price is more intuitive for Cournot competition because the latter is
equated across platforms in equilibrium.
28This is driven by the linearity of externalities in our setup, and implies in particular that the e¤ect of a
merger on consumers in our model does not depend on the sign of network externalities on each side but only
on the magnitude of total network externalities. This is a limitation of our model.
29The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of all rms in the industry.
30This approach is in line with the view that we should care about welfare on each side of the market.
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4.3 The e¤ect of a merger between two platforms
4.3.1 General demand
Notice rst that in our homogeneous Cournot model, the e¤ect of a merger on side-i consumer
surplus is fully captured by its e¤ect on side-i total participation. Indeed, side-i consumer
surplus is given by
R Ni
0 [~vi   Zi(Ni)] dFi (~vi) ;which depends on participation only through Ni:
Therefore, a merger raises consumer surplus on a given side of the market if and only if it raises
participation on that side (or, equivalently, if it lowers the externality-adjusted price on that
side).
A merger between two (or more) platforms may a¤ect total participation on each side of the
market through two channels. First, it can change the average marginal cost of the industry,
either upward or downward depending on which platforms merge.31 In the Appendix, we show
that a decrease (increase) in the average marginal cost of the industry on any side of the
market benets (harms) consumers on both sides. Second, a merger a¤ects total participation
on each side through the change in the number of platforms in the market. This e¤ect is
more complex. To investigate it we introduce the concept of average-marginal-cost-preserving
(AMCP) mergers, i.e., mergers that do not a¤ect the average marginal costs of the industry
c1 and c2. The following proposition provides su¢ cient conditions for such a merger to benet
or harm consumers on both sides of the market.
Proposition 1 Consider an AMCP merger between two platforms and assume that all plat-
forms are active both before and after the merger.
- If the pre-merger externality-adjusted prices are above average marginal costs on both sides
of the market, then the merger harms consumers on both sides.
- If the pre-merger externality-adjusted prices are below average marginal costs on both sides
of the market, then the merger benets consumers on both sides.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that non-standard welfare e¤ects of mergers can only arise if
at least one externality-adjusted price is below average marginal cost in the corresponding
side. When both prices are large enough for the externality-adjusted price to be above average
marginal cost on both sides, the market power e¤ect of mergers dominates potential e¢ ciency
gains stemming from larger participation on each platform. When both externality-adjusted
prices are below average marginal cost, the reverse holds.
In the case when only one externality-adjusted price is below cost, it is possible that one
side benets and the other is harmed by the merger. To address this issue and provide su¢ cient
31Assuming that the merged platforms marginal cost is the lowest cost of the merging platforms, a merger
between two platforms reduces average marginal cost (on a given side) if and only if the marginal cost of the
less e¢ cient one is above the industry average marginal cost.
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conditions (for the merger to harm or benet consumers) that are formulated in terms of the
primitives of the model, we now consider the special case of linear demand.
4.3.2 Linear demand
Assume that the demand function on each side of the market is linear. More precisely, suppose
that Zi (Ni) = 1   Ni for i = 1; 2. We assume further that cki < 1 for any i 2 f1; 2g and
k 2 f1; :::;Kg.
In this scenario, Assumption 1 reduces to 1+2 < 2. Moreover, one can rewrite the su¢ -
cient conditions provided in Proposition 1 using the primitives of the model: both externality-
adjusted prices are above (below) the corresponding average marginal costs if and only if total
network e¤ects 1 + 2 are su¢ ciently small (large).32
We now provide provide a more precise characterization of the impact of an AMCP merger
on consumers.
Proposition 2 Suppose that demand is linear, and w.l.o.g. that c2  c1 < 1. Assuming that
all platforms are active,33 there exist two thresholds f(K; c1; c2) 2 (0; 1) and g(K; c1; c2) 2 (1; 2)
such that a marginal AMCP reduction of K:
- harms consumers on both sides of the market if 0  1 + 2 < f(K; c1; c2),
- benets consumers on side 1 and harms consumers on side 2 if f(K; c1; c2) < 1 + 2 <
g(K; c1; c2),
- benets consumers on both sides of the market if g(K; c1; c2) < 1 + 2 < 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
While the above results are derived only for a marginal decrease in K, they extend to
a discrete change from K to K   1 as long as the corresponding condition holds everywhere
between K 1 and K. We show in the Appendix that f is increasing in K while g is decreasing
inK: This implies that: (i) a merger harms consumers on both sides if 1+2 < f(K 1; c1; c2),
(ii) a merger benets consumers on side 1 and harms consumers on side 2 if f(K; c1; c2) < 1+
2 < g(K; c1; c2); and (iii) a merger benets consumers on both sides if 1+2 > g(K 1; c1; c2).
The ndings for the small and large network e¤ect scenarios conrm the results of Propo-
sition 1. More interestingly, we show that a see-saw e¤ect arises for network e¤ects of inter-
mediate size: in that case, a reduction of K benets consumers on the higher-cost side while
it harms consumers on the lower-cost side. Interestingly, which side benets from the merger
does not depend on which side receives the highest network benets (as only total network
e¤ects 1 + 2 matter).
The linear model also sheds light on merger protability in a multi-sided Cournot setting.
Absent cost-related e¢ ciency gains, a merger between two platforms is protable in our sym-
metric linear model if there are no more than four rms, marginal costs are not too high and
32We provide the exact thresholds on total network e¤ects in the Appendix.
33Condition (4) in the proof of the proposition is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for this to hold.
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network e¤ects are large enough.34 In that case, the network e¢ ciency gains due to higher con-
centration outweigh the negative output contraction e¤ect that undermines the protability of
mergers in Cournot models (see e.g. Salant et al. 1983).
5 Conclusion and future research
This paper argues that the Cournot model can be a useful addition to the toolkit for merger
analysis in multi-sided markets. We illustrate this by deriving the e¤ect of a merger between
platforms on its users in a simple two-sided Cournot model. We believe that extensions of this
model may help address some of the issues raised by the analysis of mergers in multi-sided
markets both in theory and in practice.
The Cournot model can be a valuable complement for the canonical Bertrand model of
competition between platforms. This is particularly clear for the analysis of mergers involving
competition among homogeneous platforms, for which standard Bertrand models raise major
tractability issues. Moreover, the Cournot model allows to relate the HHI (or an adapted
version of it) to measures of market power such as the adjusted versions of the Lerner index
we discussed. This can help dene rules for the preliminary screening of mergers in two-sided
markets.
The existing models of horizontal mergers in multi-sided markets usually impose strong
restrictions regarding the nature of competition between platforms and the behavior of their
users. This contrasts with the diversity of both the business models used by platforms and the
consumption patterns of their users. It is therefore not surprising that there are still many
issues that need to be addressed by future research.
A rst obvious, yet important, issue is the extension of models of mergers in multi-sided
markets to situations where agents multi-home. With few exceptions (such as Anderson et al.,
2012 and Anderson et al., 2018), the existing models, including ours, assume that agents single-
home on both sides of the market. Multi-homing may however occur on one or both sides of the
market and changes dramatically the nature of competition between platforms. Indeed, while
single-homing consumers choose between one or the other platform, multi-homing consumers
choose how many platforms to join. The value of a platform for a multi-homing consumer is
then reduced to its incremental value so that direct price comparison may not be relevant for
her. In this context, the literature on media platforms has shown that the e¤ects of a merger
di¤er from the case where marginal consumers are single-homing. A general analysis of the
e¤ect of mergers in a model with endogenous decisions to single-home or multi-home remains
to be done.35
34When marginal costs are equal to zero, a merger between two out of three platforms is protable if 1+2 >
0:5858, and a merger between two out of four platforms is protable if 1 + 2 > 1:5858:
35See Ambrus et al. (2016) and Anderson et al. (2018) for models of two-sided media market with endogenous
multi-homing on the consumer side.
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A second issue that still needs to be addressed is the interaction between business models
and mergers. Indeed, a merger may have a very di¤erent impact if the platforms are free
for users on one side or charge users on all sides. In particular, the price may increase or
decrease on a given side depending on whether the other side is charged a positive price or not.
Moreover, the e¤ect may depend on whether the platforms choose quantities on the paying
side, as assumed in media models, or prices, as assumed in matching models. A di¤erent, but
related, question is whether a merger may induce a change of business model. For instance,
platforms that are free on one side due to intense competition on any of the two sides may
choose to charge a positive price once a merger relaxes competitive pressure.
It would also be interesting to examine the incentives of the merged entity to maintain both
platforms after a merger. In our homogeneous Cournot model, a merger is tantamount to a
reduction in the number of platforms. In the case of di¤erentiated platforms, this may not be
the case and the merged entity may choose to maintain both platforms. This raises the question
of a merged entitys incentive to make the platforms it owns interoperable when it keeps them
separate.36 Interoperability typically reduces platformsdi¤erentiation. Therefore, when decid-
ing on interoperability, the merged entity needs to seek the right balance between the benets
of network e¤ects induced by interoperability and the benets of platformsdi¤erentiation.
Finally, note that all the existing theoretical papers analyzing the e¤ects of mergers among
multi-sided platforms assume static competition. Although some equilibrium concepts - such
as the insulated equilibrium or the Cournot equilibrium - are guided by implicit dynamic
considerations, it would be useful to move towards a more dynamic analysis of mergers in
multi-sided markets. This is even more important for platform markets than for traditional
markets because of two features, emphasized by Arthur (1996), that are particularly prevalent
in technology markets. First, the presence of network e¤ects combined with rapid technolog-
ical progress makes the market highly volatile with rapid change of leadership. Second, some
platform markets tend to exhibit a winner-take-all feature so that there is competition for
the market but little competition on the market. Competition in this context is then shaped
by history dependence (Arthur, 1989), incumbency advantage (Biglaiser et al., 2013; Biglaiser
and Crémer, 2016) and consumersexpectations (Jullien and Pavan, 2017; Halaburda et al.,
2017). In this context, a static view of mergers between platforms may be misleading either by
over-emphasizing current strong market position in a dynamically competitive environment or
by underestimating the e¤ect of a merger between future potential competitors.
36For instance, after acquiring Waze, Google allowed direct navigation between Google Maps and Waze.
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6 Appendix
Su¢ ciency of Assumption 1 for the second-order condition
The second-order conditions for optimality of the best reply are:8<:2Z 01 (N1) + Z 001 (N1)nk1 < 02Z 01 (N1) + Z 001 (N1)nk1 2Z 02 (N2) + Z 002 (N2)nk2 > (1 + 2)2 : (2)
To check that these conditions are satised under Assumption 1, notice that
2Z 0i (Ni) + Z
00
i (Ni)n
k
i < 2Z
0
i (Ni) + max

Z 00i (Ni)Ni; 0
	
< 0.
This implies that h
2Z 01 (N1) + Z
00
1 (N1)n
k
1
i h
2Z 02 (N2) + Z
00
2 (N2)n
k
2
i
>
2Z 01 (N1) + max

Z 001 (N1)N1; 0
	 
2Z 02 (N2) + max

Z 002 (N2)N2; 0
	
> (1 + 2)
2 :
Uniqueness of the solution to the system of conditions (1)
Under Assumption 1, KZ1 (N1)+Z 01 (N1)N1 is a continuous and strictly decreasing function
of N1, which ranges from +1 (when N1 = 0) to  1 (when N1 = 1). Therefore, there is a
unique and interior value of N1 for which the rst equation of (1) holds, as a function of N2,
which we denote by R1(N2). It is clear that R1 : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is continuous and strictly
increasing, with derivative given by R01(N2) =
 (1+2)
(K+1)Z01(N1)+Z
00
1 (N1)N1
.
Dene R2 : [0; 1]! [0; 1] in a similar way, and observe that R1 and R2 surely intersect. If
R01(N2)R02(N1) < 1, the reaction functions R1 and R2, which exhibit strategic complemen-
tarity, intersect only once. Hence, uniqueness of a pair (N1; N2) that satises (1) is guaranteed
if: 
(K + 1)Z 01(N1) + Z
00
1 (N1)N1
 
(K + 1)Z 02(N2) + Z
00
2 (N2)N2

> (1 + 2)
2;
which is implied by Assumption 1. Indeed,
(K + 1)Z 0i(Ni) + Z
00
i (Ni)Ni < 2Z
0
i(Ni) + max

Z 00i (Ni)Ni; 0
	
< 0
which leads to

(K + 1)Z 01(N1) + Z
00
1 (N1)N1
 
(K + 1)Z 02(N2) + Z
00
2 (N2)N2

>

2Z 01 (N1) + max

Z 001 (N1)N1; 0
	 
2Z 02 (N2) + max

Z 002 (N2)N2; 0
	
> (1 + 2)
2
The HHI in a two-sided Cournot model
Denote ski  nki =Ni the market share of platform k on side i and HHIi 
PK
k=1
 
ski
2
the
Herndahl-Hirschmann index on side i. Let us consider the following adjusted Lerner index for
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platform k on side i obtained by replacing prices with externality-adjusted prices:
Lki 
zi   cki
zi
:
The corresponding aggregate Lerner index for side i is given by
Li 
KX
k=1
ski L
k
i :
The rst-order condition for the maximization of platform ks prot with respect to nki is
zi + Z
0
i (Ni)n
k
i = c
k
i   (1 + 2)nkj
where j 6= i, and can be rewritten as
Lki =
ski
"i
  1 + 2
zi
Njs
k
j .
Therefore,
Li =
HHIi
"i
  1 + 2
zi
SNj =
HHIi
adjustment termz }| {
 1 + 2
zi
S"iNj
"i
; (3)
where
S 
KX
k=1
sk1s
k
2
can be interpreted as a measure of the correlationbetween the platformsmarket shares on
the two sides of the market. Expression (3) shows that for the HHI to be a good measure of
the aggregate Lerner index on a given side, it needs to be adjusted downward with respect to
its standard denition for a one-sided market. This adjustment should be greater the larger
the network e¤ects and the larger the correlation between market shares on the two sides of
the market.
E¤ect of a change in the average marginal cost of the industry on consumers
Denote by Ni the total mass of side-i consumers that are served in equilibrium. Di¤eren-
tiating the system of conditions (1) with respect to c1 yields8<: [(K + 1)Z 01 (N1 ) + Z 001 (N1 )N1 ]
@N1
@c1
+ (1 + 2)
@N2
@c1
= K
(1 + 2)
@N1
@c1
+ [(K + 1)Z 02 (N2 ) + Z 002 (N2 )N2 ]
@N2
@c1
= 0:
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Solving this system leads to8><>:
@N1
@c1
=
K[(K+1)Z02(N2 )+Z002 (N2 )N2 ]
[(K+1)Z01(N1 )+Z001 (N1 )N1 ][(K+1)Z02(N2 )+Z002 (N2 )N2 ] (1+2)2
@N2
@c1
=  K(1+2)
[(K+1)Z01(N1 )+Z001 (N1 )N1 ][(K+1)Z02(N2 )+Z002 (N2 )N2 ] (1+2)2
:
Assumption 1 implies that that the numerator of @N

1
@c1
is negative and that the (common)
denominator of @N

1
@c1
and @N

2
@c1
is positive. It follows that @N

1
@c1
and @N

2
@c1
are negative, which
implies that a decrease (increase) in the average marginal cost of the industry on a given side
of the market benets (harms) consumers on both sides of the market.
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote by Ni the total mass of side-i consumers that are served in equilibrium and z

i the
equilibrium externality-adjusted price on side i. Di¤erentiating the system of conditions (1)
with respect to K (it is instrumental to treat K as a continuous variable) yields8<: [(K + 1)Z 01 (N1 ) + Z 001 (N1 )N1 ]
@N1
@K + (1 + 2)
@N2
@K = c1   Z1 (N1 )
(1 + 2)
@N1
@K + [(K + 1)Z
0
2 (N

2 ) + Z
00
2 (N

2 )N

2 ]
@N2
@K = c2   Z2 (N2 ) :
This leads to8><>:
@N1
@K =
1
[(K+1)Z01(N1 )+Z001 (N1 )N1 ][(K+1)Z02(N2 )+Z002 (N2 )N2 ] (1+2)2
@N2
@K =
2
[(K+1)Z01(N1 )+Z001 (N1 )N1 ][(K+1)Z02(N2 )+Z002 (N2 )N2 ] (1+2)2
where
i  [ci   zi ]

(K + 1)Z 0 i
 
N i

+ Z 00 i
 
N i

N i
  c i   z i (1 + 2) :
Assumption 1 implies that the denominator of @N

1
@K and
@N2
@K is positive. Therefore, the sign of
@Ni =@K is the same as the sign of 

i .
Since 1 + 2 > 0 and (K + 1)Z 0i (Ni) + Z
00
i (Ni)Ni < 0 (under Assumption 1), the e¤ect
of a merger on the mass of users on each side depends on the signs of the externality-adjusted
price-cost margins z1   c1 and z2   c2. More precisely:
- If the externality-adjusted price is above cost on both sides, then a (marginal) decrease
in K leads to a decrease in the mass of users served on both sides of the market.
- If the externality-adjusted price is below cost on both sides, then a (marginal) decrease
in K leads to an increase in the mass of users served on both sides of the market.
- Otherwise, the e¤ect of a (marginal) decrease in K on consumers is generally ambiguous.
Finally, to verify that the e¤ects on consumers of a discrete reduction in K have the same
sign as those of a marginal decrease in K, observe that:
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- If zi > ci for both i = 1; 2, then @N

i =@K > 0, which means that @z

i =@K < 0. This
implies that margins remain positive as K diminishes and thus the e¤ect on zi of a discrete
reduction in K is the integral of the e¤ect of a marginal reduction in K, whose sign remains
constant.
- If zi < ci for both i = 1; 2, then @N

i =@K < 0, which means that @z

i =@K > 0. This
implies that margins remain negative as K diminishes and thus the e¤ect on zi of a discrete
reduction in K is the integral of the e¤ect of a marginal reduction in K, whose sign remains
constant.
Comparison of the externality-adjusted prices with the corresponding average mar-
ginal costs under a linear demand
Both externality-adjusted prices are above the corresponding average marginal costs if and
only if
1 + 2 <
s
K
2
1 min (c1; c2)
1 max (c1; c2)
2
+K + 1  K
2
1 min (c1; c2)
1 max (c1; c2) ;
and both externality-adjusted prices are above the corresponding average marginal costs if and
only if
1 + 2 >
s
K
2
1 max (c1; c2)
1 min (c1; c2)
2
+K + 1  K
2
1 max (c1; c2)
1 min (c1; c2) :
Proof of Proposition 2
The rst-order conditions for the maximization of k with respect to nk1 and n
k
2 are given
by: (
1 N1   nk1   ck1 + (1 + 2)nk2 = 0
1 N2   nk2   ck2 + (1 + 2)nk1 = 0:
Summing the rst-order-conditions across platforms and solving the corresponding system leads
to the following equilibrium total participations on the two sides of the market (assuming all
platforms are active in equilibrium):8>><>>:
N1 =
K
K+1
1 

1+2
K+1
2 h(1  c1) + 1+2K+1 (1  c2)i
N2 =
K
K+1
1 

1+2
K+1
2 h(1  c2) + 1+2K+1 (1  c1)i :
Denote H = 1K+1 ,  = 1 + 2, di = 1   ci (recall that  2 [0; 2) and d2  d1 > 0). It
is straightforward to show that all platforms are active if and only if the following condition
holds for any platform k:
H
 
1  2
1  2H2 [1  ci + H (1  cj)] + ci + cj > c
k
i + c
k
j for i = 1; 2; j 6= i (4)
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The equilibrium mass of users served in equilibrium on side 1 can be rewritten as
N1 =
1 H
1  2H2 (d1 + Hd2) :
Therefore,
@N1
@H
=
   1  2H2+ 22H (1 H)
(1  2H2)2 (d1 + Hd2) +
1 H
1  2H2d2
=
J (;H; d1; d2)
(1  2H2)2
where
J (;H; d1; d2)   d1 + d2 [1  2H]| {z }
>0
+H (2 H) d1| {z }
>0
2 +H2d2| {z }
>0
3
which implies that
@J
@
(;H; d1; d2) > 0
for any   0: This, combined with the fact that J (0;H; d1; d2) =  d1 < 0 and the continuity
of J (;H; d1; d2) with respect to  implies that there exists a unique threshold ~ (H; d1; d2) 2
(0; 2] such that J (~ (H; d1; d2) ;H; d1; d2) = 0, and that
@N1
@H < 0 for  2 [0; ~ (H; d1; d2)) and
@N1
@H > 0 for  2 (~ (H; d1; d2) ; 2).
Similarly,
@N2
@H
=
J (;H; d2; d1)
(1  2H2)2
By analogy, the threshold ~ (H; d2; d1) 2 (0; 2] is such that @N

2
@H < 0 for  2 [0; ~ (H; d2; d1))
while @N

2
@H > 0 for  2 (~ (H; d2; d1) ; 2).
Notice that J (0;H; d1; d2) and J (0;H; d2; d1) are both negative, that J (1;H; d1; d2) > 0 >
J (1;H; d2; d1) ; and that J (2;H; d2; d1) > ( 1 + 4H(2 H)) d1 > 0: This implies that 0 <
~ (H; d1; d2) < 1 < ~ (H; d2; d1) < 2. Denoting f(K; c1; c2)  ~ (H; d1; d2) and g(K; c1; c2) 
~ (H; d2; d1), we get the result.
Monotonicity of f and g
From J (~ (H; d1; d2) ;H; d1; d2) = 0 it follows that
( d2 + d1) 2H = ( d1 + d2)
 
1 H22
at  = ~ (H; d1; d2), which implies that  d1 + d2~ (H; d1; d2) < 0:
Therefore,
@J
@H
(~ (H; d1; d2) ;H; d1; d2) =
( d1 + d2~ (H; d1; d2))
h
3H22 (~ (H; d1; d2))
2   1
i
H
> 0
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Di¤erentiating J (~ (H; d1; d2) ;H; d1; d2) = 0 with respect toH and using the fact that @J=@ >
0 we get:
@~ (H; d1; d2)
@H
=
  @J@H (~ (H; d1; d2) ;H; d1; d2)
@J
@ (~ (H; d1; d2) ;H; d1; d2)
< 0
Hence, @f(K; c1; c2)=@K > 0. Similarly, we can show that  d2 + d1~ (H; d2; d1) > 0 and use
the same reasoning as above to prove that @g(K; c1; c2)=@K < 0:
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